From our first scan, we found 130,980 OpenSSH servers that are still vulnerable to the CBC-mode-specific attack of Albrecht et al.
Dropbear and OpenSSH implementations dominate in our scans. We report deployment statistics based on two Internet-wide scans of SSH servers conducted in late 2015 and early 2016. This work presents a systematic analysis of symmetric encryption modes for SSH that are in use on the Internet, providing deployment statistics, new attacks, and security proofs for widely used modes.
#Mailmate missing emal update
While it is advisable to update the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards to fix these vulnerabilities, some clients had even more severe implementation flaws allowing straightforward ex-filtration of the plaintext. We devise working attacks for both OpenPGP and S/MIME encryption, and show that exfiltration channels exist for 23 of the 35 tested S/MIME email clients and 10 of the 28 tested OpenPGP email clients. The attack works for emails even if they were collected long ago, and it is triggered as soon as the recipient decrypts a single maliciously crafted email from the attacker. We describe malleability gadgets for emails using HTML, CSS, and X.509 functionality. These snippets abuse existing and standard conforming backchannels to exfiltrate the full plaintext after decryption. We use CBC/CFB gadgets to inject malicious plaintext snippets into encrypted emails.
We describe novel attacks built upon a technique we call mal-leability gadgets to reveal the plaintext of encrypted emails. OpenPGP and S/MIME are the two prime standards for providing end-to-end security for emails.
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